Thanks for posting this. A very interesting document, to say the least.
Firstly, it is dated 14 May 2024 and addressed: FTAO Licensing Managers. As far as I am aware Palace do not employ a licensing manager, let alone employ a dedicated body of staff.
Licensing is a highly specialised profession, and the top clubs will have a team of staff, usually based in London, dedicated to this very important aspect of a club’s function. It has also, in recent years, been expanding fast as the ever increasing sophistication of managing a global brand requires marketing offices and football schools situated all over the world that are dedicated to their particular brand development.
It should be said that these elite clubs are not just a successful version of ourselves. They are a part of a highly sophisticated network of vested interests that ensures most of the money generated within the game is distributed back to these elite clubs. A good example of this are the fines that regularly get handed out to top clubs, but in reality this money is just redistributed back to them.
As the chief executive of Lokomotiva Zagreb is reported as saying, the current unchallenged system means that “Uefa has distributed €22 billion in prize money in the last 25 years and €7 billion [around one third] of that has gone to just 12 clubs.” We might add that three quarters of all the money has gone to just 50 clubs.
Needless to say, elite European clubs have no interest whatsoever in the aspirations of smaller clubs. Yes, they like to see the underdog win, but not at their expense. Indeed, these clubs run a business that is more similar to the corporate world of entertainment giants like Disney, Marvel, or Warner Bros, where IP (intellectual property) is king.
Nottingham Forest is, without question, a primary example of what happens to a very successful European club that is not also an established global brand. Back in 1984 they were in the UEFA Cup semi-final against Anderlecht, but were defeated thanks to a bribed referee. UEFA knew about it for years but chose to ignore it. Eventually, in 1997, they banned Anderlecht from all European competitions for a year. No way would this have happened to a club like Real Madrid or Manchester United! I remember that match, and it was probably the most bizarre match I have ever watched.
Now, to this document, which covers regulations for the 2024-25 season, with ramifications for subsequent seasons. It was sent out by the CFCB, and was emailed to all European league associations, who then forwarded it to all league clubs. It was also emailed to the ECA, who have two ex officio members on UEFA’s executive board, which means they have access to privileged information not available to non ECA members. It should be noted a club cannot choose to join the ECA, they can only apply to join, as an associate member, once they have qualified for a UEFA competition. And in the the absence of a licensing manager, this document would have been forwarded to the club secretary, via that well known email address
info@cpfc.co.uk, which in our case should have been forwarded by a member of the admin team to Christine Dowdeswell, who would then be obliged to provide suitable legal advice to all directors, with particular attention paid to David Blitzer and John Textor. This document carried the heading, in bold and underlined:
Admission procedure to the 2024/25 UEFA men’s club competitions Multi-Club Ownership rule and related interpretation of “decisive influence”.
Paragraph four states: “As per the Competitions Regulations, if there is a doubt as to whether clubs fulfil the MCO rule, the case is referred to the UEFA Club Financial Control Body (“CFCB”), which then decides on the admission of the clubs concerned in accordance with the Procedural rules governing the UEFA Club Financial Control Body (“Procedural Rules”).”
This should therefore be self explanatory as to what were Christine Dowdeswell’s responsibilities regarding any doubt about the application of these regulations.
The critical area of concern is the sixth paragraph with the following clarification:
“Since its creation in July 2021, the CFCB First Chamber has applied the following indicators when assessing whether a party (i.e. a natural or legal person, a legal entity or a government), either alone or in aggregate together with a related party, directly or indirectly, has the capacity to exercise a decisive influence in the decision-making of a club:”
a.
Decisive influence through shareholders’ or members’ rights
i If a party* holds 30% or more of the club’s total shares, the shareholders’ or members’ voting or economic rights.
* either alone or in aggregate together with a related party, directly or indirectly
From this we can clearly see that the CFCB would deem Crystal Palace to be an MCO club, which is based upon John Textor owning 43% of its shares. This is classified by the CFCB as a “
de jure decisive influence over a club.” In other words, even though Steve Parish is the chairman and CEO and he has
de facto overall control or influence, European law generally will sway towards the codified nature of regulations and will not give precedence to established practise.
Moreover, even if John Textor were below the 30% threshold, the CFCB would still need to investigate a possible “
de facto decisive influence over such a club.” However, this circular does not make it clear how any such investigation would be initiated. But the inference must be drawn that the CFCB are expecting clubs to regulate themselves.
It also explains why it was we were demoted to the Conference League, and was not expelled from all European competitions, as David Blitzer owns only 25% of both voting shares and total shares, which is a part of his global MCO operation. However, even this would be called into question by the CFCB because of an assumed “decisive influence” that would need to be subject to further scrutiny.
Yes, the decision was grossly disproportionate for a first-time offence. Yes, other clubs have got away with little or no sanction. Yes, there is now no MCO conflict of interest. Yes, the general secretary of UEFA, Theodore Theodoridis, has close family ties to Evangelos Marinakis, but there is no getting away from this brutal truth that Palace were aware of the
de jure reality that they were an MCO club in the eyes of UEFA on the 1 March 2025. But I do not hold either Christine Dowdeswell or John Textor to blame. Textor was in an impossible situation, which has been previously commented upon in other postings. He was caught up in a complex web of competing issues and interests, both within Palace and beyond.
But this is where it gets interesting: putting in place measures to ensure compliance, like selling your shares, either completely or by putting them into a blind trust, is a temporary measure that only applied to last season up to the final deadline of 3 June 2024; and this is only allowed if you have contravened none of its requirements. In other words, the CFCB is allowing club directors or legal entities to utilise this as a discretionary temporary option, which expired at the close of the 2024-25 season.
“For the avoidance of doubt, this temporary alternative is granted by the CFCB First Chamber on an exceptional basis for the 2024/25 UEFA competitions. As such, the CFCB will not be bound by this alternative when assessing clubs’ compliance with the MCO rule for participation in UEFA competitions in subsequent seasons.”
And unless someone can cite an updated document, this requirement still stands.